Pretrial Release in California: Proposed Reforms of an Unfair System by Blizzard, Thadd
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 13
1-1-1977
Pretrial Release in California: Proposed Reforms of
an Unfair System
Thadd Blizzard
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thadd Blizzard, Pretrial Release in California: Proposed Reforms of an Unfair System, 8 Pac. L. J. (1977).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol8/iss2/13
Pretrial Release in California:
Proposed Reforms of an Unfair System
I walked down the hallway
And I heard the door slam,
Turn turn again,
I walked down the courthouse stairs
And did not understand,
Turn turn to the rain and the wind.
-Percy's Song (Dylan)
Bail is a practice founded upon the concept that one accused of a crime
may be released and trusted to return to court at the proper time if there is
some monetary incentive involved. This method of providing pretrial re-
lease has traditionally been a part of the American legal system. Recently,
however, doubts have arisen as to whether monetary incentive is a proper
method of ensuring court attendance, and alternative methods of pretrial
release have been developed. These doubts stem from the increasing realiza-
tion that defendants can be trusted to return to court without requiring them
to post a money bond, and that when money is used as the key to freedom,
indigent defendants are at a disadvantage in gaining release. This comment
will discuss the purposes of an ideal pretrial release system, and analyze the
systems currently used in California and other jurisdictions. The other
systems to be examined are those implemented under the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1966, the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act, the Illinois Ten Percent plan, and Oregon's pretrial release
reforms. Following this comparative analysis, legislative changes will be
suggested to correct defects found to exist in California's present pretrial
release system.
THE PURPOSES OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
Pretrial release systems, as facets of the execution of criminal justice,
have several possible purposes. These include assuring the presence of
defendants in court; releasing those defendants who can be trusted to
reappear; and, arguably, securing public safety by detaining those who
might commit crimes while free pending trial. To understand California's
present system, each of these theoretical purposes must be explored.
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As demonstrated by the continued use of the ancient' practice of bail,
criminal justice systems have had to reconcile the interests of one accused of
crime, who wishes to be free pending trial, with those of the state, which
desires the accused's prompt appearance at required proceedings.2 Unless
the court has reason to believe that the accused will reappear, confusion and
inefficiency will result from the pretrial release of defendants. Accordingly,
the major statutory purpose of almost every bail law in the country is to
assure the presence of the accused at court.' Although other methods of
pretrial release have been created as bail alternatives, such methods have
been aimed at mending existing inequities regarding which defendants are
released, and have not changed the underlying premise that reappearance
before the court is of paramount importance in any release system.
Having determined that a primary interest of the state in the administra-
tion of a pretrial release system is assurance that all those accused of crime
will be present before the court when required, it then becomes a function of
pretrial release laws to provide as much freedom from detention to as many
persons as possible. This preference for pretrial freedom exists because
pretrial detention compromises the accused's presumption of innocence and
may have an effect upon the ultimate outcome of the defendant's trial. 4 As
Chief Justice Vinson pointed out in 1951, 5 the presumption of innocence
until proven guilty has been secured only after centuries of struggle. Since
the presumtion of innocence should carry with it freedom from punishment
until punishment is shown to be deserved, and since being held in jail before
trial may be a form of punishment, a pretrial release system that fails to
release the greatest number of defendants who can be expected to reappear
violates one of the basic tenets of our legal system.
It has also been recognized that defendants released prior to trial have an
advantage over those detained.6 Those released can search out and locate
1. See generally E. DE HAAS, ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL: ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOP-
MENT IN CRIMINAL CASES TO THE YEAR 1275 (1966); Comment, Bail: An Ancient Practice
Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966 (1961).
2. Comment, Tinkering with the California Bail System, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1135
(1968). See also Comment, Footnote to Furman: Failing Justification for the Capital Case
Exception to the Right to Bail After Abolition of the Death Penalty, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 349,
350-60 (1973):
The postulate of a bresumption of innocence is the embodiment of the proposition
that a man who stands accused of crime is fully entitled to freedom and respect as an
innocent member of the community until regular criminal process has proved his
guilt. His liberty may be limited only as necessary to assure the progress of the
proceedings pending against him . . . . Bail is a method used to assure the timely
progression of the criminal process while minimizing the interference with individual
freedom and dignity.
3. P.B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE, 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WICE]:
Although the judiciary varies widely in their implementation of . . . statutory
guidelines, every jurisdiction surveyed in this study with a single exception, was
directed to use bail for a singular purpose. This purpose is simply to have the court
set bail at an amount which they believe will insure the presence of the defendant at
the requested time.
4. See text accompanying notes 6-10 infra.
5. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
6. See Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California,
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witnesses, help with defense preparations, and maintain employment and
family ties. 7 It has been shown statistically that those defendants released
prior to trial stand a better chance of ultimate acquital. 8 The higher convic-
tion rate for those detained can be attributed not only to the fact that a
defendant detained until trial has less opportunity to help with his or her
defense, but also to the influence upon the jury of the sight of the poorly-
exercised, ill groomed defendant, dressed in jail clothes, who has a certain
"jail pallor" and who is escorted into the courtroom under guard. 9 The
defendant who enters the courtroom showing no signs of having languished
in jail presents a sharp contrast to such a person.
10
Implementing the release of as many arrestees as possible also necessi-
tates the detention of all those who would not reappear. Starting with the
obvious assumption that detention of all defendants would result in the
appearance of all of them before the court-a failure to appear rate (FTA) of
zero-a well-conceived pretrial release system must balance the competing
state and personal interests so that all those defendants who will, in all
probability, return to court are offered some form of release. Those, how-
ever, who apparently will not reappear should be detained. Since the
fundamental interest of liberty is at stake, an ideal system would, to the
greatest extent possible, provide methods for determining which defendants
could be trusted to reappear if released.
Pretrial detention to protect the public from further criminal activity by
the defendant is another possible purpose of pretrial release systems. 1I The
concept of pretrial detention is based upon the premise that, in addition to
the state's interest in assuring defendants' presence in court, the state has a
legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from the risk of further criminal
activity on the part of those already accused of crime, and that pretrial
detention should be used to further that interest. 12 The basic issue appears to
5 PAC. L.J. 675, 687 (1974); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641
(1964).
7. See Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California,
5 PAC. L.J. 675, 689-90 (1974); Villagran, The Mastodon of Bail, 4 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 35,
44-46 (1975).
8. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125,
1148-50 (1965); Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to Califor-
nia, 5 PAC. L.J. 675, 687-90 (1974).
9. See Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California,
5 PAC. L.J. 675, 690, (1974).
10. While of course it is not true that, just because a criminal is released before trial he or
she is any less culpable or should be looked upon favorably; and indeed the fact that those
detained tend to be convicted may be because they truly are guilty, there does seem to be a
chance that pretrial detention will affect the jury's opinion of a defendant, a factor which
should be minimized by an ideal criminal justice system.
11. See generally Portman, "To Detain or Not to Detain?"--A Review of the Background,
Current Proposals, and Debate on Preventive Detention, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 224 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Portman].
12. Cf. Dershowitz, On Preventive Detention, The N.Y. Rev., March 13, 1969, quoted in
Portman, supra note 11, at 226, in which it is stated that increased bail reforms and court delays
have apparently caused an increase in the number of crimes committed by defendants between
arrest and trial, since more defendants are free, and for a longer time, pending disposition of
their cases.
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be whether or not our legal system can allow the detention of a defendant,
not on the basis of a likelihood he or she will flee the court's jurisdiction, but
because there is a suspicion that the individual might commit further crimes
if released before trial. Under such a pretrial detention system it would
become necessary to predict whether a certain person will be likely to
formulate a criminal intent sometime in the future and carry out that intent,
based only upon the fact that he or she has already been accused of a crime.
Although factors such as the defendant's prior record and the severity of the
crime charged are available for consideration, it is difficult to know the
significance of each of these factors. The problem remains, as Professor
Foote has said, that:
We know almost nothing in criminology about the factors that
distinguish those few accused robbers or rapists who will commit
a crime on pretrial liberty from the majority of the accused rob-
bers and rapists who will not commit such a crime on pretrial
liberty. To imagine that, at a preliminary hearing soon after arrest,
a judge could make a reliable determination about an accused's
future dangerousness when very little data about the accused will
then be available to him, and we do not know what that little data
means anyway, it seems to me is to indulge in pure fantasy. 13
Above and beyond the practical problems involved in predicting likely
recidivists, there is the additional consideration that pretrial detention be-
cause of predicted criminal activity would again compromise the presump-
tion of innocence. While it is true that this presumption is not a constitution-
al right, it has been considered an expression of the belief that there should
be no deprivation of liberty without due process of law.14 Under this due
process interpretation, it may become necessary to question the adequacy of
hearing processes and available procedural safeguards. It appears inevitable,
however, that no matter on what grounds the theory of preventive detention
is advanced, it will remain unsupported by the data necessary to determine
whether future crimes are likely to be committed. It is perhaps wisest to
follow the doctrine underlying Mr. Justice Jackson's famous statement that:
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsum-
mated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught
with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it
15
13. Hearings on Amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong., Ist Sess.
352 (1969), cited in Portman, supra note 11, at 250.
14. Comment, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1501 (1966). But
see Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579, 584-86 (D.C. 1974), in which it was held that due
process was not violated by the alleged compromise of the presumption of innocence.
15. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (1950). See also Commonwealth v.
Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 338, 296 A.2d 829, 836 (1972):
It would. . . be contrary to the whole foundation of our penal system, since our laws
punish for past offense [to] incarcerate a person to prevent future offenses.
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Though perhaps laudable in its aim, a pretrail release system which attempts
to detain those likely to commit further crimes bears a double burden of
prediction. First, the system must determine whether the defendant can be
trusted to return voluntarily to the court. This involves a decision regarding
the responsibility of the individual and his or her capacity to withstand the
temptation not to reappear. Second, the system must determine whether
pretrial detention as a crime prevention device is warranted. Prediction of
future court appearance is limited in scope to the likelihood of the individual
carrying out one act that is relatively simple and backed by a great weight of
legal compulsion. The prediction of future criminal activities, on the other
hand, involves a more complex set of possibilities, since any number of
criminal acts might be contemplated and carried out by the released defend-
ant. Given that our legal system has only dubious capability of predicting
future crimes, it would appear that preventive detention should not be part of
an ideal pretrial release system. 16
In summary, the function of a pretrial release system is to release as many
defendants as possible without hindering the efficient operation of the
courts. Release should be granted when the person's later appearance in
court is reasonably assured. Although preventive detention for protection of
the public is another theoretical purpose for pretrial release systems, it
appears that there are legal and practical doubts about its usefulness.
CALIFORNIA'S PRETRIAL RELEASE SYSTEM
California provides two methods of pretrial release to those accused of
crime: bail, 17 and own recognizance (OR) release.' 8 To understand the
present status of pretrial release in California, it is necessary to examine the
way in which each of these methods functions, and compare them to the
purposes of pretrial release discussed above.
A. Bail
Gaining pretrial release under bail procedures involves the undertaking of
a bond, by the defendant or a professional surety, to be paid if the defendant
fails to appear in court when required. 19 California has rejected the concept
16. Although it is valid to question the ability of a court to predict defendants' reappear-
ance under bail procedures with any more accuracy than defendants' reappearance under
preventive detention procedures, at least there has been a traditional acceptance of the former,
especially since bail predictions are for the most part accurate. See text accompanying note 32
infra.
17. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1268-1298.
18. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1318-1319.6.
19. See, e.g., R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL 3 (1966). Molleur also
describes the function of the professional surety:
In short, the bondsman is a businessman who, for a price, enables an accused
otherwise suited for release on bail to satisfy the financial condition of his freedom.
If a bondsman fails to produce the bailed accused on the specified date, he is liable in
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of preventive detention, as it has been held that securing the appearance of
the defendant is the only legal purpose of bail.2"
In California, a defendant has the right to bail under both the state
constitution" and statutory law, 22 except in capital cases where "the proof
of his guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great."
23
It is important to note that California's constitutional provision has been
designated by the California Supreme Court as being a greater assurance of
the right to bail than is the eighth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.24 The federal provision has been interpreted to mean that bail is not
constitutionally guaranteed. 25 The California Supreme Court has stated that
the provision in the state constitution that all persons shall be bailable was
consciously added to the "no excessive bail" language adopted from the
eighth amendment, so that it would be clear that all except capital defend-
ants have the right to release on bail.
26
the amount of the bond and can be required to forfeit it. . . . The bondsman has
power to arrest the bailee if flight is suspected or unusual difficulties are encountered
during the bail period.
Id. at 11-13.
20. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345,348,508 P.2d 721,723, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401,403 (1973):
The purpose of bail is to assure the defendant's attendance in court when his
presence is required, whether before or after conviction. [Citations]. Bail is not a
means for punishing defendants [citations] nor for protecting the public safety.
21. CAL. CONsT. art. I, §12:
A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital crimes
when the facts are evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail may not be
required. A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's
discretion.
22. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1271.
23. CAL. PEN. CODE §1270. An issue is raised as to whether capital offenses still exist in
California, since the state's death penalty statute has been found unconstitutional. Rockwell v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 426, 556 P.2d 1101, 1104, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 653 (1976). Other
writers have dealt with this issue, see Comment, Footnote to Furman: Failing Justification for
the Capital Case Exception to the Right to Bail After Abolition of the Death Penalty, 10 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 349 (1973); Comment, Roll v. Larson: The Right to Bail in Capital Cases After
Furman v. Georgia, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 421, including the California Supreme Court. People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 899-900 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171-72 n. 45
(1972), stating in part:
The underlying gravity of [capital] offenses endures and the determination of their
gravity for the purpose of bail continues unaffected by [the abolition of the death
penalty].
The better view appears to be that pretrial liberty in cases that were formerly capital should be
determined by the same standards as bail in non-capital cases. See Comment, Footnote to
Furman: Failing Justification for the Capital Case Exception to the Right to Bail After Abolition
of the Death Penalty,10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 349, 379 (1973). Such an approach would, of course,
include weighing the fact that the defendant has been accused of a serious offence, and that the
likelihood of failure to appear in court is accordingly greater. The death penalty may soon be
reinstated in California, however, since the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
death penalty statutes can operate in harmony with the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). Death penalty legislation in California may
be forthcoming. See SB 155, 1977-78 Regular Session; AB 240, 1977-78 Regular Session.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
25. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1952). But see Foote, The Coming Constitu-
tional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965), wherein the author traces the historical
background of the eighth amendment, and finds that bail should be a matter of right.
26. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 349-50, 508 P.2d 721, 724, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404
(1973). Note that the constitutional provision discussed is former article I, §6, which was
virtually the same as the present bail provision in article I, §12.
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Within the California judiciary, it has been held that, where the offense is
non-capital, bail is a matter of right, 27 and that the California constitutional
provision was intended to abrogate the common law rule that bail was a
matter of judicial discretion. 28 Thus, under California's present pretrial
release system, bail is an option always available to the non-capital defend-
ant.
B. Analysis of the California Bail System
Critics assert that California's present bail system does not function as
effectively as a pretrial release system should. 29 California's Attorney Gen-
eral Evelle Younger has stated that our present bail system is the worst
system possible.30 It is difficult to determine the efficiency of a bail system
because of the possible unreliability of indicators. FTA rates, for example,
may be misleading since many bail forfeitures are merely technical or
involuntary. 31 Bail is apparently effective to a great extent, however, in
assuring court attendance. 32 A complex problem arises, however, when
considering whether the bail system releases all the defendants it could.
Reasonable bail must be set in all non-capital cases; the amount is deter-
mined by a judge who has a statutory duty to consider the seriousness of the
offense charged, the defendant's previous criminal record, and the probabil-
ity of his or her appearance in court.3 3 After bail is set, however, the
question of the defendant's freedom is out of judicial hands. 34 Attorney
General Younger emphasized the continuing problem of the many thousands
of persons being kept in jails all over the country for no better reason then
that they are poor or poor bond risks. 35 Since release after bail is set depends
upon the defendant's financial resources, the system must of necessity
condemn to pretrial detention those without money or a professional surety.
Although the amount of bail supposedly bears a relationship to the purpose
27. In re Scaggs, 47 Cal. 2d 416, 303 P.2d 1009 (1956).
28. In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 513 P.2d 621, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973).
29. See Villagran, The Mastodon of Bail, 4 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 35 (1975); Younger,
It's Time to Forfeit Bail, 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 262 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Younger]; Ryan, The
Last Days of Bail, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 542 (1967); Comment, Bail in the United States: A
System in Need of Reform, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 380 (1968).
30. Younger, supra note 29, at 262.
31. WICE, supra note 3, at 68.
32. Wice states that in his survey, 80 percent of the cities estimated an FTA rate of zero to
nine percent for money bail defendants. Id. In a study by Wayne Thomas, A Decade of Bail
Reform (April, 1974) (unpublished manuscript) cited in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
EVALUATION OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
PROGRAMS 72 (1975), it was found that the average FTA rate for defendants on money bail was
nine percent.
33. CAL. PEN. CODE §1275.
34. This is assuming no alternative methods of release, such as release on own recogni-
zance, are offered.
35. Younger, supra note 29, at 265. See also Portman, supra note 11, at 228, in which it is
indicated that the percentage of defendants who could not make bail in the District of Columbia
is 66 percent. See also La Fave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8, 10,
in which it was estimated that the percentage of defendants who could not make bail ranged
from 54 to 79 percent in large urban areas.
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of assuring the defendant's reappearance, 36 any amount of bail will force
some defendants to stay in jail regardless of the likelihood of reappearance
at trial. This discrepancy between purpose and effect has led to "at best
• . . a system of checkbook justice; at worst, [a] highly commercialized
racket. ",
37
Because release under bail laws is conditioned on the monetary resources
of the defendant, the bail system may be vulnerable to an equal protection
challenge. 38 In the case of In re Antazo ,9 the California Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether the incarceration of a convicted indigent was
permissible where the only reason for detention was inability to pay a fine. 40
The court pointed out that, for those without money, the choice to pay a fine
or be imprisoned was no choice at all. The court concluded:
We cannot countenance such a difference in treatment and...
we conclude that it constitutes an invidious discrimination on the
basis of wealth in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 41
The court found that a distinction based upon wealth was a "suspect
classification" which was to be evaluated under the strict standards requir-
ing a compelling state interest to justify the imprisonment of a convicted
defendant whose indigence precluded payment of his fine.42 Ultimately it
was determined that there was no such compelling state interest justifying
the difference in treatment and the procedure was held unconstitutional. 43
Although the Antazo ruling involved post conviction release and not pretrial
liberty, it appears to be sufficiently analogous for the purpose of anticipating
that the California Supreme Court should apply the same logic in a pretrial
bail case.
36. See CAL. PEN. CODE §1275.
37. Goldberg, Foreword to R. GOLDFARB. RANSOM ix (1965).
38. The Equal Protection Clause provides two levels of protection. If a challenged
classification affects nothing more than business and economic regulation, it is
presumed to be constitutional and will be sustained as long as there is some 'rational
connection' between the classification and the legislative objective. On the other
hand, when the discrimination impinges upon a fundamental interest it is 'unconstitu-
tional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are "necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest," ' and 'the State cannot choose means that un-
necessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity.' Dunn v. Blums-
tein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
The California Supreme Court has adopted the same two-tier formulation in constru-
ing the equal protection concept embodied in article I, §§11 and 21 of the California
Constitution. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n.Il (1971).
Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief at 13, Van'Atta v. Scott, No. 662-928 (Super. Ct. of S.F. County,
Sept. 29, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief]. See also Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1180 (1965):
[P]retrial detention of an accused who would go free but for differences in financial
circumstances is a violation of the equal protection clause.
See also, Comment, Bail and Its Discrimination Against the Poor: A Civil Rights Action as a
Vehicle of Reform, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 167 (1974), in which a §1983 federal action theory is
explored; Comment, The Bail System and Equal Protection, 2 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 71 (1969).
39. 3 Cal.3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
40. Id. at 103, 473 P.2d at 1000, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
41. Id. at 104, 473 P.2d at 1000, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (emhasis added).
42. Id. at 112, 473 P.2d at 1006, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
43. Id. at 115-16, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
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The Antazo court's reasoning, if used in the context of pretrial release,
would seem to require a finding that the release of those defendants with
money for bail and the detention of those without bail money creates a
discriminatory classification based on wealth. 44 To uphold such a classifica-
tion, the state must show a compelling interest for the discrimination. The
Antazo court found no such interest in post conviction situations, and it
seems even less likely to do so in a pretrial case, where the same liberty is at
stake. Further, in the bail situation, the defendant has not yet been convicted
and is presumed to be innocent.45
Since pretrial detention for want of bail denies a fundamental personal
liberty and seriously affects the basic fairness of the criminal justice system,
such detention must be subjected to both the compelling state interest test,
and the requirement that the state show its interest cannot be achieved in a
way less restrictive of personal liberty and fairness. 46 Although securing the
presence of the accused in court is arguably a compelling interest, it appears
that the bail system's discrimination between rich and poor does not serve
that interest, and that such discrimination is not the means least restrictve of
the defendant's liberty. 47 If it is true that defendants can be trusted to reappear
when released on non-monetary conditions in many cases, a money bail
system would unduly restrict the freedom of indigent defendants. Since the
state bears the burden of establishing that the legal distinctions drawn in
equal protection situations are necessary to further its interests, 48 it seems
reasonable to conclude that California's bail laws amount to a denial of
equal protection until such time as the state demonstrates that the difference
in treatment of rich and poor defendants is necessary to secure their reap-
pearance in court. 49
As administered within their statutory framework, California's bail laws
5 °
also appear to violate due process of law as guaranteed by the federal and
California Constitutions. 51 The statutes violate due process because through
their operation defendants are deprived of pretrial liberty without the benefit
of a proper hearing to determine whether incarceration is necessary to ensure
appearance, or whether appearance may be equally well assured by other
44. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
45. See Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California,
5 PAC. L.J. 675, 693 (1974):
If there is no compelling state interest in denying post-trial liberty for involuntary
nonpayment of a fine, then there can be no compelling state interest in denying
pretrial liberty for involuntary nonpayment of bail.
46. Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 15.
47. Id.
48. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 111, 473 P.2d 999, 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 261 (1970).
49. Although California's bail and own recognizance release statutes were ably attacked
in the case of Van Atta v. Scott, No. 662-982 (Super. Ct. of S.F. County, Sept. 29, 1976) on
equal protection grounds, the court preferred to find the statutes unconstitutional on due
process grounds. See text accompanying notes 55-65 infra.
50. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1268-1298.
51. See note 65 infra.
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means.52 In California the only hearings that are statutorily required are
those for the purpose of determining whether the defendant should be
released on his or her own recognizance--a purely discretionary matter-
and the automatic review of the bail order when the defendant is held for
lack of bail.54
The crux of a due process argument is that a vital interest found to be
within the purview of the "liberty or property" language of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments has been affected without procedural fairness.
55
Since the interest affected here is liberty, and since that liberty takes on
special importance if it is likely to be a factor in the outcome of one's trial,
56
it is reasonable to conclude that pretrial liberty would come within the scope
of the constitutional due process guarantees.
The next problem is to determine which procedural format will afford due
process.57 It appears that a hearing should be held to determine the necessity
for pretrial detention, so that the defendant's freedom is not compromised
without the need for detention being proved, additionally, it should be
required that the government bear the burden of proving the necessity for
confinement or lesser restrictions pending trial.5 8 If pretrial release is even-
tually denied, the decision-maker should provide the accused with a written
statement of the basis for the decision. 59 This statement was also found to be
important in United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger,6° where the court
stated that the failure to indicate the motivating reasons for denial of bail
was in itself an arbitrary action in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
61
It is also arguable that the exaction of a ball bond without a prior hearing
is itself a deprivation of property without due process. 62 In order to obtain
release after bail is set, the accused must pay a professional surety a
non-refundable premium equal to ten percent of the bail amount plus other
valuable consideration against the bond.63 Alternatively, the defendant who
can afford to do so may deposit his or her own money in lieu of an
undertaking,64 but in that case he or she is deprived of the use of the money
52. Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 17.
53. CAL. PEN. CODE §1318.
54. CAL. PEN. CODE §1320. This type of hearing has been characterized as informal and
lasting only a few minutes, with no evidence being produced as to the defendant's ability to put
up any amount of bail. Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 18.
55. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
56. See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
57. See Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 20.
58. These procedural guidelines for the pretrial detention hearing were found to be
necessary to comport with the minimum requirements of due process in the case of DeChamp-
lain v. Lovelace, 510 F.2d 419,424 (8th Cir. 1975). Note, however, that this case was vacated as
moot by the United States Supreme Court, 421 U.S. 996 (1975), and that it therefore cannot be
considered other than historical evidence indicating possible judicial reasoning in the future.
59. De Champlain v. Lovelace, 510 F.2d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 1975).
60. 322 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. 111. 1971).
61. Id. at 787. See also Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 22. But see Starkey v.
Swenson, 595 F. Supp. 594, 596 (E.D. Md. 1974).
62. See Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 25.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 23-24.
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during the time prior to trial. In either case there will have been no hearing
to determine the necessity for bail.65 Thus it appears that sound constitution-
al attacks can be mounted against present bail practices, both on equal
protection and due process grounds.
66
C. Own Recognizance Release
In addition to release on bail, California provides defendants the possibili-
ty of release on their own recognizance. 67 Own recognizance release is a
practice by which a defendant is set free without monetary security in
exchange for the promise that he or she will reappear in court. This concept
of pretrial disposition emerged in the late 1950's68 and early 1960's and has
experienced increasing popularity. 69 In California, however, the OR statutes
have been described as "grafted . . . onto the bail system," providing
nothing more than a method of releasing some of those who cannot make
bail. 70 Regardless of its defects, OR release has at least the potential for
providing a viable non-monetary alternative to traditional bail practices.
D. Analysis of OR Release in California
OR release in California, and throughout the country, has proved reason-
ably capable of assuring the presence of defendants before the court. 71 In
65. See id. The court apparently agreed with this and the plaintiff's other due process
arguments, for it held that:
The existing system of pre-trial release and detention [in California], as applied and
practiced in San Francisco constitutes a violation of, and is prohibited by, the due
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and
Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of California in the following
respects: (1) existing statutes and practices do not require the prosecution to assume
the burden of proving that bail is necessary, [and] that the amount requested by the
prosecution is required for such purpose; (2) existing statutes and practices do not
require the courts to furnish a written statement of reasons for denial of own
recognizance release.
Judgement at 2, Van Atta v. Scott, No. 662-928 (Super. Ct. of S.F. County Sept. 29, 1976). But
see Kawaichi v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 461, 126 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1975), in which the court
stated that:
If the court were required to state reasons for setting bail rather than releasing an
arrestee on OR, a court would be required to state reasons for its rulings at every
motion and hearing throughout the entire criminal judicial process . . . . If due
process requires these burdens in the lower courts of this state, then the legislature
needs to revise the present system.
Id. at 467, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
66. Since bail is authorized by the California Constitution, and since bail of necessity
involves considerations of wealth, it is arguable that bail cannot be attacked as violative of
equal protection. The state consitution, however, refers to "release on ball by sufficient
sureties," and the gist of the equal protection attack is that the state must use the means least
restrictve of the defendant's freedom, and that in many cases little or no money constitutes
sufficient surety.
67. CAL. PEN. CODE §1318.
68. Note that California's OR statute, CAL. PEN. CODE §1318, was originally enacted in
1959.
69. See generally R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (1966); Comment,
Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California, 5 PAC. L.J. 675 (1974).
70. Comment, Beyond the Bail System: A Proposal for Pretrial Release in California, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 1112, 1120-21 (1969).
71. See WICE, Bail and Its Reform: A National Survey. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SUMMARY REPORT 33-37 (1973). This report shows OR
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California in 1974 it was estimated that the state-wide FTA rate for persons
released on OR ranged from 1.7 percent in San Bernardino to seven percent
in Los Angeles. 72 This is to be compared to a forfeiture average for persons
released on bail of between four and five percent." It would seem, then that
OR procedures are working generally as well as bail in assuring the reap-
pearance of those released before trial.
The question remains, however, whether California's OR statutes provide
for the release of a maximum number of eligible defendants. California
Penal Code Section 1318, which is the heart of California's OR release law,
provide3 that, upon good cause being shown, a judge may release a defend-
ant on own recognizance if it appears that he or she will reappear. 74 It is
further expressed in the statutes that OR release powers are purely discre-
tionary with the court, and that no defendant has the right to be released on
OR. 75 Since bail in California cannot be denied for purposes other than
assuring the presence in court of the accused, and since the statutory
criterion for OR release reflects the same purpose,76 it would seem that the
only justifiable reason for denying OR is that there is doubt as to whether the
defendant will reappear. It appears, however, that every year thousands of
defendants are denied relief through this avenue.77 The reasons for the
denial of OR release in many cases may be the absence of proper criteria for
the channeling of judicial discretion. 78 Judicial hostility to the method may
also be a factor in the denial, since many judges confronted with the task of
predicting the likelihood of the defendant's reappearance may be conserva-
tive in their judgments and resolve doubts by denying OR.79 Since bail will
FTA rates of eight major cities as ranging from 0.7 percent to 19 percent. See also Plaintiff's
Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 30-32, which discloses that the following jurisdictions have
these FrA percentages:
bail OR
Philadelphia (1974) 10 7.1
Washington D.C. (1975) not avail. 6
Brooklyn (1972-74) 8+ 8
Multnomah County, Or. (1975) not avail. 4
San Francisco (1974) not avail. 4.1
72. Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California, 5
PAC. L.J. 675, 681-84 (1974).
73. Id. at 683.
74. CAL. PEN. CODE §1318.
75. CAL. PEN CODE §1318.2. See also CAL. CONSr. art. I, §12, which states in part:
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion
(emphasis added).
76. See also In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 613, 427 P.2d 179, 183, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583
(1967), in which the court asserted that OR release, as an alternative to bail, has the primary
purpose of assuring the defendant's attendance in court.
77. Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 38.
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id.
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be set for all non-capital defendants in any event, it is easy to see why
judges, accustomed to the traditional bail system, opt for requiring money
bail to resolve uncertainties about the defendant.80
Because bail is constitutionally required in California, those defendants
denied OR release can post bail and thus gain their freedom. The result is
that two classes of defendants are created-those released pending trial and
those detained-with wealth as the determining factor.81 Thus, the OR
procedures do not appear to cure the equal protection flaws found in the bail
statutes. 82 The basis of this argument is that, when OR release is denied-a
decision based on non-monetary considerations and left wholly to judicial
discretion-the only form of release that remains available to the defendant
is bail, which is violative of equal protection in that it may result in
imprisonment for involuntary nonpayment of bond.83 As asserted at trial in
the case of Van Atta v. Scott, 84 most, if not all, defendants who remain in
custody after their bail is set do so only because they lack the financial
resources to post bond. 85 Thus it can be seen that the addition of a discre-
tionary OR statute has not remedied the problem of defendants being held
prior to trial for nonpayment of money bail.
THE FEDERAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS
In contrast to the California pretrial release system, which is a combina-
tion of traditional bail procedures and a purely discretionary OR release
provision, a variety of pretrial release reforms has taken place throughout
the country. From an analysis of these reforms, it should be possible to
suggest concrete reforms for California based upon the successful elements
present in other systems.
A. The Federal Bail Reform Act
The Federal Bail Reform Act86 was passed by Congress in 1966. The now
famous findings of the Vera Institute (the Manhattan Bail Project),87 and the
D.C. Bail Project,88 had by that time shown that many defendants could be
trusted to return to court following non-monetary release, and that some
factors existed that could measure the likelihood of reappearance. s9 The
80. See Younger, supra note 29, at 266.
81. Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California, 5
PAC. L.J. 675, 691 (1974).
82. See id. at 690-95.
83. See text accompanying notes 38-49 supra.
84. Van Atta v. Scott, No. 662-928 (Super. Ct. of S.F. County Sept. 29, 1976).
85. Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 11.
86. 18 U.S.C. §3146 et seq. (1964).
87. See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use
of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 67 (1963).
88. See R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (1966).
89. In the Manhattan Bail Project, for example, the following five factors were consi-
dered as indicators of the defendant's likely reappearance:
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Reform Act came after a congressional finding that "present federal bail
practices are repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution and dilute the basic
tenets that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. ' 9° The
purpose of the Act was to revise the practice relating to bail to assure that no
defendants, regardless of their financial status, would be needlessly detained
pending their appearance in court. 91
To effect this purpose, the Act has instituted a system whereby, in each
case, a list of statutorily prescribed factors is to be considered. 2 The object
in considering these factors is to determine whether to release the individual
on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond, or the least
restrictive of the following: (1) Placement in the custody of another; (2)
placement of restrictions on travel, association, or place of abode; (3)
execution of a bond, with payment of ten percent to the court (refundable);
(4) execution of a traditional bail bond; (5) any other condition reasonably
necessary to assure the presence of the defendant, including a requirement
that he or she return to custody after specified hours. 93 These provisions
have been judicially interpreted as creating a strong policy in favor of
release on personal recognizance, 94 and only when such release will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the accused should other conditions of
release be imposed. 95 Although traditional bail remains available under the
Act, it has been designated the "least desired condition because it discrimi-
nates against the poor in contravention to the purpose of the Act."
96
Accordingly, a substantial money bond should be imposed pursuant to the
Act only after all other alternatives are rejected as being insufficient to
reasonably assure the appearance of the accused. 97
Since its enactment, the Act has been credited with two major accom-
plishments:
(1) Present or recent residence at the same address for six months or more;
(2) Current or recent employment for six months or more;
(3) Relatives in the New York City area with whom in contact;
(4) No previous convictions; and
(5) Residence in New York City for ten years or more.
If one of these criteria were met, or two partially met, the case was further investigated by the
Project. Id., Appendix at 47.
90. S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. §2(a)(1) (1965), cited in REPORT OFTHE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL COMMIrEE TO STUDY THE OPERATION OF THE BAIL REFORM ACT IN THE DISTRIcT OF
COLUMBIA 1 (1968).
91. Id. at §2(b).
92. 18 U.S.C. §3146(b) (1964):
In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure appearance, the
judicial officer shall, on the basis of available information, take into account the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against
the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character
and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of
convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid
prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.
93. 18 U.S.C. §3146(a) (1964).
94. Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
95. United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
96. United States v. Gillin, 345 F. Supp. 1145, 1147 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
97. Id.
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[I]t has safely released tens of thousands of defendants who would
otherwise have remained in jail or have suffered the loss of hard
earned money on bond premiums. . . [and] has closed a profound
credibility gap in our American system of justice. It is simply not
possible to talk sincerely about equal justice so long as a price tag
is placed on the release of citizens who come before the criminal
courts. . . . [The] Reform Act has begun the process of rescuing
our courts from the heavy burden of hypocrisy. 98
Thus, it can be seen that the federal government, aware of flaws in its bail
system similar to those existing in California's pretrial release procedure,
was able to address the problem with innovative legislation.
B. The District of Columbia Reform
One of the primary criticisms of the Federal Bail Reform Act has been
that pretrial release cannot be denied for public safety purposes under its
provisions.99 One federal jurisdiction in which the argument in favor of
preventive detention was especially pronounced was the District of Colum-
bia. That city has a unique problem in that the type of criminal released there
is unknown, or little known in almost every other federal district court.100
The reason for this is that the District of Columbia District Court, having
jurisdiction over criminals normally within the ambit of state courts, had 61
percent of all the homocides, 27 percent of all assaults, 32 percent of all sex
offenses, 47 percent of all robberies, and 47 percent of all burglaries tried in
the federal system in 1967.101
In 1970, the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act'02 was passed, which authorized preventive detention in the District.
0 3
This Act was considered a step backward by some, 104 being arguably replete
98. Statement by Patricia M. Wald before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights (Jan. 22, 1969), cited in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE. THE BAIL REFORM ACT/ AN
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND AN ALTERNATIVE 13 (1969).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966):
A solution [to the problem of crimes committed by defendants released pending trial]
goes beyond the scope of the present proposal and involves many difficult and
complex problems which require deep study and analysis. The present problem of
reform of existing bail procedures demands an immediate solution. It should not be
delayed by consideration of the question of preventive detention.
See also S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
100. Statement by Senator Joseph D. Tydings before the Senate Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights (Jan. 22, 1969), cited in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE BAIL REFORM
ACT/ AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND AN ALTERNATIVE 13 (1969).
101. Id.
102. Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
103. D.C. Code §23-1321(a):
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death, shall
be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance. . . unless the
[judicial] officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will
not reasonably assure the the [sic] appearance of the person as required or the safety
of any other person or the community.
(emphasis added).
104. Ervin, Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6
HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 291 (1971).
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with constitutional defects. 10 5 An empirical study on preventive detention
performed in 1971106 revealed that the system for predicting recidivists
under the District of Columbia Act was not very reliable.107
Thus far, the District of Columbia Act has withstood actual constitutional
attack, 108 and it appears that to some extent the preventive detention con-
troversy has become a thing of the past. 109 Preventive detention is, by
judicial fiat, not authorized in California, 10 and is therefore not available as
an option within our state framework.
C. The Illinois Ten Percent Plan
In the early 1960's, lawmakers in Illinois were concerned that existing
state bail practices often required bond of several thousand dollars in many
cases where the accused was ultimately fined fifty dollars or less. 11' Defend-
ants were rarely permitted to sign their own bond, even if they had been
living in the area for many years. 11 2 Also, bond was often initially fixed and
105. Id. at 297-98. Senator Ervin called the constitutional arguments against preventive
detention "so numerous that their recitation looks like the model answer to an issue spotting
question on a law school examination." Among those mentioned were:
(I) violation of the eighth amendment right to reasonable bail in noncapital cases;
(2) imprisonment for unproved, anticipated crime;
(3) the offense of "dangerousness" is unconstitutionally vague;
(4) it violates the presumption of innocence;
(5) it convicts on the basis of "substantial probability" rather than "beyond a
reasonable doubt";
(6) it prejudices the defendant in the trial for the actual crime;
(7) it does not provide procedural due process in the detention hearing.
106. Preventive Detention: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 6 HARV. Cv. RIGHTS---CIv. Li. L. REV.
300 (1971).
107. Id. at 369:
The District of Columbia law's criteria for identifying defendants likely to commit
bail offenses provide little hint of which defendants will become double offenders. At
no time do the criteria individually or collectively provide a means of isolating even a
small group of defendants, more of whom are recidivists than are not.
108. See, e.g., Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579, 584-86 (D.C. 1974), which held that
due process was not violated by the District of Columbia Act as alleged, the allegation being
that the presumption of innocence had been compromised and that the "reasonable doubt"
standard had been denied in proving the need for detention. But cf. Tyrrell v. Taylor, 394 F.
Supp. 9 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd as modified sub nom. United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker,
535 F.2d 823 (1976), which held that substantive due process was violated where pretrial
detainment imposed restrictions significantly greater than those imposed on convicted
prisoners.
109. WICE, supra note 3, at 5:
As [the author] toured the country and interviewed numerous public officials and
concerned citizens, it was discovered that preventive detention was viewed as a
problem restricted to the crime ravaged nation's capital. In none of the cities visited
was there a movement developing to enact similar procedures. Most informants
agreed that either their court systems were accomplishing preventive detention
informally. . . or that it simply was not needed in their community.
Note that AB 2834 was introduced in California in 1971, and would have enacted a statutory
scheme very similar to that of the District of Columbia, as far as both pretrial release and
preventive detention. See Comment, Preventive Detention in California: Can Some Criminal
Defendants be Detained Prior to Trial?, 3 PAc. L.J. 142 (1972).
110. See note 20 supra.
111. Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 35
[hereinafter cited as Bowman].
112. Id.
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then if the case were transferred to another court, a second bond required,
even for minor crimes.' 1 The result of these bail practices was to "fatten
the purse of the professional bondsman," and to cause some of those
accused of crime in cases of minor offenses to pay more to be free pending
trial than the ultimate penalty if convicted.1
14
To remedy this situation, the state enacted a system, based on a practice
that had occasionally been used in New York,115 whereby defendants have
the option of putting up a cash deposit in the amount of ten percent of the
bail normally required instead of providing the traditional surety bond.
116
Upon making this deposit the defendant is released,1 17 and if the conditions
of the bond are performed, the defendant receives a refund of ninety percent
of the amount deposited. 118 This means that the court retains only one
percent of the normal bond amount to cover costs.
119
The ten percent plan was immediately heralded as successful, with FTA
rates lower than those occuring with traditional bonds. 120 Upon reevaluation
in 1972, the plan was found to still be effective, although FTA rates had
climbed somewhat over the years. 121 Weaknesses pointed out in 1972 were,
among other things, a lack of sufficient information upon which to deter-
mine a bond amount; no follow-up procedures to remind defendants of court
dates; and lack of an effective apprehension system for defaulting defend-
ants. 122 Despite its shortcomings, the ten percent deposit system has pro-
vided an alternative to traditional bail and has effectively eliminated the
need for professional sureties. 123 Thus, Illinois has removed from its crimi-
nal justice system the danger of arbitrary extrajudicial factors causing
pretrial confinement, 124 while maintaining the integrity of its courts.
D. Oregon's Reforms
The Oregon Constitution states that "[o]ffences (sic), except murder, and
treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. '" 125 It also provides that
113. Id.
114. Id. at 36.
115. See Foote, Foreword: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 685,
719 (1958).
116. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §110-7 (Smith-Hurd), enacted 1963 Ill. Laws 2836, §110-7. See
Bowman, supra note 111, for a discussion of the background of this law.
117. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §110-7(b) (Smith-Hurd).
118. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §110-7(f) (Smith-Hurd).
119. It is interesting to note that this statutory scheme has withstood actual attack on equal
protection grounds, the argument in the case being that the one percent fee retained by the court
was unfairly levied only against those not rich enough to post the entire bail amount (in which
case nothing would be kept by the court). The Supreme Court found that the "rational basis"
test applied, and that there was such a basis for the one percent fee. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357 (1971).
120. Bowman, supra note 111, at 38-39.
121. See Smith & Reilley, The Illinois Bail System: A Second Look, 6 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PROC. 33, 40-42 (1972).
122. Id. at 43-45.
123. Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 7 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 272 (1968).
124. See text accompanying notes 34 and 35 supra.
125. OR. CONST. art. I, §14.
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"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required .... "126 The statutory scheme
[hereinafter referred to as Article 8] for pretrial release under this constitu-
tion has recently been revised. 127 Except for persons in custody for traffic
violations, 128 any person in custody is entitled to be released in accordance
with the new provisions, except in murder or treason cases.1 29 Article 8
requires that a release decision be made within forty-eight hours after
arraignment,130 unless a "security release"131 is requested by the accused at
the time of his or her initial appearance before the magistrate, in which case
it is provided that there is "an immediate right to release."' 13 2 The magis-
trate is required to advise defendants of their right to a security release,
133
which is to be granted pending a decision whether to provide an alternative
mode of release.
134
The release decision, like that under the Federal Reform Act, must
impose the least onerous condition reasonably likely to assure the person's
later appearance. 135 To emphasize this requirement, the Oregon legislature
also provided that a person in custody "shall be released upon his personal
recognizance unless release criteria show to the satisfaction of the magistrate
that such a release is unwarranted." 136 This statutory language can be said to
be evidence of a legislative intent to create a presumption of entitlement to
release on OR. 137 Only after full consideration of specified criteria, 138 and a
finding that personal recognizance release is unwarranted, may a magistrate
refuse OR release. 139 The basic procedure has been borrowed from the
Federal Bail Reform Act, 14° and the burden is on the district attorney to
show that the prisoner will not appear if released on OR. 141
126. OR. CONST. art. I, §16.
127. OR. REV. STAT. §§135.230-135.290.
128. See Snouffer, An Article of Faith Abolishes Bail in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REV. 273,
280-81 (1974), in which it is indicated that Article 8 is apparently applied to these defendants in
most cases anyway [hereinafter cited as Snouffer].
129. Id. at 281.
130. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(2).
131. "Security release" is release on full or ten percent money bail. See OR. REV. STAT.
§135.230(8).
132. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(1).
133. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(1).
134. See Snouffer, supra note 128, at 286, & n.87.
135. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(3).
136. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(3).
137. See Snouffer, supra note 128, at 287.
138. OR. REV. STAT. §135.230(6). These criteria are:
(a) the defendant's employment status and financial condition;
(b) the nature and extent of the defendant's family relationships;
(c) the defendant's past and present residences;
(d) names of persons who agree to assist him or her in making required court
appearances;
(e) the nature of the current charges;
(f) the defendant's prior criminal record;
(g) any factors indicating the possibility of violations of law if the defendant is
released without regulations;
(h) any facts tending to indicate that the defendant has strong community ties;
(i) any other facts tending to indicate that the defendant is likely to appear.
139. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(3).
140. See Snouffer, supra note 128, at 287 n.100.
141. See id. at 288.
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Three types of release are available under Article 8: personal recognizance
release (OR); conditional release; 142 and security release. 143 Whichever type
is utilized, a "release agreement" must be filed, which is a "sworn writing
by the defendant stating the terms of the release and, if applicable, the
amount of security."'" If the release is OR or conditional, the defendant
must agree to the "general conditions" of the release agreement, which are
that he or she will: (1) appear to answer the charge(s) in court on a day
certain; (2) submit to the orders and process of the court; (3) not depart the
state without leave of the court; and (4) comply with such other conditions
as the state may impose.145 The "other conditions" language used here is
not to be confused with that referring to conditions that may be imposed
under conditional release. That is, since conditions which are "regulations
on the activities and associations of the defendant" are to be imposed only
after appropriate inquiry into the advisability of OR release, and since the
spirit of the statute is to impose the least onerous conditions likely to assure
the defendant's later appearance, the only conditions that appear proper
under the "other conditions" clause of the release agreement are those
which do not substantially affect a defendant's activities or associations and
which are appropriate or relevant to court proceedings, such as requiring
notice of changes in address or phone number. 146
If personal recognizance release is not granted, a finding to the effect that
it is unwarranted is required, 147 and conditional release must be consid-
ered. 148 Such release, patterned after the conditional release available in
federal courts, is a nonsecurity release which imposes regulations on the
activities and associations of the defendant. 14 9 The conditions enumerated in
the statute are: (1) release into the care of another;150 (2) reasonable regula-
tions on the activities, movements, associations, and residences of the
defendant; (3) release of the defendant from custody only during working
hours; and (4) any other reasonable condition designed to assure the defend-
ant's appearance. 51 The purpose of conditional release is to provide a
middle ground between unsupervised recognizance release and pretrial de-
tention 52 for the defendant lacking the necessary funds for security release.
142. OR. REV. STAT. §135.230(1) defines conditional release as "a nonsecurity release
which imposes regulations on the activities and associations of the defendant."
143. OR. REV. STAT. §135.265. The security release provision allows either the deposit of
cash in an amount equal to ten percent of the "security amount"--of which 90 percent is
refundable--or the deposit of cash or other property equal to the entire "security amount."
144. OR. REV. STAT. §135.230(5).
145. OR. REV. STAT. §135.250.
146. See Snouffer, supra note 128, at 298-99.
147. See id. at 291.
148. OR. REV. STAT. §135.245(4).
149. OR. REV. STAT. §135.230(1).
150. The person who has custody of the defendant is not responsible for anything if the
defendant fails to appear, but he or she must notify the court if the defendant breaches the
conditions of release. OR. REV. STAT. §135.260.
151. OR. REV. STAT. §135.260.
152. See Snouffer, supra note 128, at 301.
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As a third alternative, Article 8 establishes security release, which re-
quires a deposit of money with the court. 153 Security release, as mentioned,
allows, as one option, deposit of ten percent of the security amount with the
court, as allowed in Illinois. Like the Illinois plan (but unlike the similar
provision of the Federal Reform Act)154 the defendant in Oregon has the
choice of depositing the ten percent, in which case the court keeps ten
percent of the amount deposited as a fee, 155 or of depositing the whole
security amount, in which case no fee is assessed. 156 If full security deposit
is the option chosen, the defendant may make payment in the form of cash,
stocks, bonds, or real or personal property owned by him or her within the
state. 157 Alternatively, someone else may assist the defendant in making the
full deposit, in which case any securities deposited must be worth double the
amount set by the court. 158
Thus, it can be seen that Oregon has a comprehensive pretrial release
system that provides the court with a number of alternatives with which to
secure the speedy release of those accused of crime. The fact that the
Oregon Legislature chose the Federal Reform Act and the Illinois Plan as
models can be taken as evidence of a faith in the continuing validity of those
systems.
E. The Success of These Other Systems
In Illinois the ten percent system is apparently working well,159 although
it has been said that there is judicial indifference to the system which affects
its proper functioning. 16 It should be noted that the ten percent plan does
not in itself solve the equal protection problems existing in traditional bail
procedures in that the ultimate release of the individual still depends upon a
deposit of money. Even though the amount required is less onerous under
the ten percent system, some defendants will lack the resources to pay
anything, and will remain in custody for involuntary nonpayment of bond.
The system does, however, have the advantage of removing the extra-
judicial factor of the professional bondsperson whose determination of the
risk involved in setting bail for a particular defendant is based on purely
selfish motives uncontrolled by the court. 161 The ten percent deposit system
153. OR. REv. STAT. §135.265.
154. 18 U.S.C. §3146(a)(3) (1964).
155. OR. REV. STAT. §135.265(2).
156. OR. REV. STAT. §135.265(3).
157. OR. REV. STAT. §135.265(3).
158. OR. REV. STAT. §135.265(3). Snouffer explains that the double security requirement is
intended to prevent bankruptcy of the surety if the defendant defaults, Snouffer, supra note
128, at 317, and that, as a practical matter, these sureties are not likely to be professional
bondspersons, since the deposit must be actual or constructive with the court. Snouffer, supra
note 128, at 315-17 & n. 282.
159. See text accompanying notes 120-121 supra.
160. WICE, supra note 3, at 156. Apparently "holiday court" (weekend) judges have been
known to spend as little as fifty-four seconds per defendant in setting bail.
161. See text accompanying notes 19 and 34-36 supra.
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does, therefore, have a desirable result, and when it is made part of a system
which creates a presumption in favor of OR release, as has been done in the
federal and Oregon systems, the equal protection problems are greatly
alleviated. 162
There appears to be a dearth of statistical information about the success of
the Federal Reform Act, although it has operated without major structural
revision for over ten years. Perhaps the success of the Oregon system, which
is similar to the Federal Reform Act, is indicative of the results achieved by
systems of that type. In Multnomah County, Oregon, during the month of
April, 1974, only 60 defendants remained in custody pending trial out of
1,017 who were booked, which means that less than six percent of those
booked were detained pending trial. 163 Under the new statutory system, the
FTA rate is approximately four percent, which is comparable to the FFA
rate on money bail in previous years.164 Since the Oregon system is largely
patterned after the Federal Reform Act, it appears that such a system is
capable of continuing success when incorportated into a state's criminal
process. As mentioned, the federal and Oregon pretrial release systems
provide equal protection safeguards in that they contain a presumption in
favor of OR release or other non-monetary release. 165 Due process is also
provided in the implementation of these systems in that the release hearing,
at which the defendant is presumed entitled to OR release, is for the purpose
of determining the necessity of pretrial detention with the government
bearing the burden of proof. 166 Also, as found important by the court in De
Champlain v. Lovelace, 167 the judge must make a specific finding that
personal recognizance release is unwarranted before alternative forms of
release may be imposed.
168
PROPOSED CALIFORNIA REFORMS
As has been demonstrated by various bail reform efforts throughout the
nation, notably the federal, Illinois, and Oregon reforms, traditional money
bail is not the only method by which the presence of defendants in court can
be reasonably assured. These reform methods have maximized both the
interests of the state in assuring trial attendance and the interests of the
accused in obtaining pretrial release. It has been seen that a set of statutorily
prescribed criteria can be helpful in guiding the exercise of judicial discre-
tion in the decision-making process regarding OR release, 169 and that a
presumption in favor of OR can result in a greater number of defendants
162. See text accompanying notes 173-174 infra.
163. Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief, supra note 38, at 29-30.
164. Id. at 31.
165. See text accompanying notes 92-97 and 135-141 supra.
166. See text accompanying notes 135-141 supra.
167. 510 F.2d 419, 427 (8th Cir. 1974).
168. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 89 and 138 supra.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
being released without a significant increase in the FTA rate. 170 Important
too, is the fact that courts can still function efficiently if defendants are
offered some from of release almost immediately after arrest.
171
It has been seen that California's pretrial release system, consisting of
traditional bail and discretionary OR procedures, has faults in that it is not as
effective as it could be in fulfilling the purposes of pretrial release.
172
California's system is also susceptible to constitutional attack. 173 The time
appears ripe for California to enact legislation to reform its pretrial release
system.
In order to provide defendants in California with due process and equal
protection, while maintaining an efficient pretrial release system, a statutory
scheme similar to Oregon's should be adopted. Such a system would not
violate equal protection in that the compelling state interest in having the
defendant reappear in court would be satisfied by the means least restrictive
of the defendant's interest in pretrial freedom. The release of certain defend-
ants on non-monetary conditions has been shown to pose no threat to the
ordered functioning of the criminal justice system. 174 The state therefore has
no compelling interest justifying the distinction between rich and poor
defendants as a factor affecting release, unless consideration of statutory
criteria show there is a danger the individual will fail to reappear. In cases
where reappearance in court is questionable, the court should be statutorily
required to impose the least onerous conditions upon release necessary to
ensure reappearance of the accused. These conditions should include money
bond as a last alternative, which means that it would be imposed only when
other types of conditional release are unwarranted. If the bond is the
refundable ten percent type, defendants will be further benefited in that
professional sureties will no longer hold the key to freedom in many cases.
This proposed system should satisfy the state's interest in assuring court
attendance in a manner least restrictve of defendants' fundamental interest in
personal liberty.
Due process would be provided under the new system also, in that there
would be a release hearing at which it is presumed that defendants are to be
released on non-monetary terms unless it is proved by the government that
such release is insufficient to ensure the defendant's future court appear-
ance. At this hearing .it would be determined whether incarceration is
necessary to further the state's interest, and due process would thus be
provided in that liberty is presumed available to the defendant unless such
necessity is proved. 175 The new hearing procedure should also provide that,
170. See text accompanying notes 137 and 164 supra.
171. For a discussion of a system allowing immediate release, see text accompanying notes
130 and 132 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 38-66 and 81-85 supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 163 and 164 supra.
175. See text accompanying 52 supra.
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if monetary release is required, the judge must make a written pronounce-
ment of the reasons why OR or conditional release were denied, as was
required by the Van Atta Court.
17 6
This proposed legislation would not provide for pretrial detention for the
protection of the public, as such detention is not legal in California. 177 The
system that would be instituted by this proposal, therefore, should be a great
step toward the elimination of the defecis in California's present pretrail
release system.
CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to acquaint the reader with the present
pretrial release practices of California and other jurisdictions, and to
evaluate those practices in light of the general goals contained in the pretrial
release concept. Through the comparison of the various jurisdictions, it has
been seen that, although no perfect pretrial release system currently exists,
those of the federal government, Illinois, and Oregon apparently come
closer to attaining the goals of pretrial release than does that of California.
This comment has attempted to analyze California's system, and has pro-
posed reforms to remedy the discovered flaws. It is hoped that these
proposals will aid in bringing about the much needed revision of Califor-
nia's pretrial release laws.
Thadd Blizzard
176. See note 65 supra.
177. See note 20 supra.
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